Touro Law Review
Volume 14

Number 3

Article 9

1998

Does New York's Death Penalty Statute Violate the New York
Constitution?
Honorable Stewart F. Hancock Jr.
Christopher Quinn
Richard Klein
Touro Law Center, richardk@tourolaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal
Procedure Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Hancock, Honorable Stewart F. Jr.; Quinn, Christopher; and Klein, Richard (1998) "Does New York's Death
Penalty Statute Violate the New York Constitution?," Touro Law Review: Vol. 14: No. 3, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/9

This New York State Constitution is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

Hancock
et al.: Death
Penalty
DOES NEW YORK'S
DEATH
PENALTY
STATUTE VIOLATE THE NEW YORK
CONSTITUTION?

Hon. Stewart F. Hancock, Jr.
Christopher Quinn
Professor Richard D. Klein
Judge Lawrence Brennan:
Good afternoon. I am Judge Lawrence Brennan from the
Nassau County Family Court, which has no jurisdiction in death
penalty cases, which makes me a perfect moderator. Until the
reinstatement of the death penalty in New York, there were only
three classes of people in our society that had the right to take
life; soldiers in time of war, police personnel and physicians, and
only under very controlled circumstances. Once again, that
power has now been given to juries under the jurisdiction of
judges.
Our first speaker is going to be Judge Stewart Hancock, who is
a retired Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, for
which he served eight years through 1993. Prior to that, he
served nine years in the Appellate Division, Fourth Department;
and prior to that six years in the Supreme Court. He was the
senior partner of Hancock & Estabrook in Syracuse, as well as
the Corporation Counsel for the City of Syracuse for two years.
He is also a renowned lecturer and author and extensively
involved at this stage of his career as counsel to his former firm
in arbitration and mediation. He is also the distinguished jurist in
residence at Syracuse University School of Law.
Christopher Quinn, our next speaker, is the Deputy Attorney
General in charge of the criminal division. He is a graduate of
the Long Island University C.W. Post College and Union College
Albany Law School. He is in charge of the division that is
equivalent in scope and comparable to any Unite States Attorney
or District Attorney in the State of New York. He supervises all
the criminal and Medicaid prosecutions, drug prosecutions, and
715

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 9

716

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

of course, he is responsible for the capital program concerning
the death penalty, which is why he is here today. Mr. Quinn was
also for ten years the law secretary to County Court Judge
Donald Belfi. You may remember him as the judge who presided
over the Colin Ferguson trial. Before that, he was in the law
departments of both the county court and district courts in Nassau
County and was in private practice as a civil negligence lawyer
for O'Connor & Hayes.
Our commentator, Professor Richard Klein, has his Bachelor's
from Wisconsin University, his Master's and Ph.D. in
International Affairs from Columbia, and his J.D. from Harvard.
Prior to becoming a Professor of Law at Touro, he was in charge
of the Director of the Criminal Justice Program at Hofstra
University School of Law, the senior trial attorney in the criminal
division for the Legal Aid Society in New York City. He has
published scores of articles. He is a frequent lecturer. Of
particular interest today is one of his more recent articles entitled
"Constitutional Concerns About Capital Punishment, The Death
Penalty Statutes in New York State," which was published by the
Journal of the Suffolk Academy of Law in 1996. I thank you for
your attention. I am going to ask Judge Hancock if he would
please come up to commence his presentation. Thank you.
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Judge Hancock:

Thank you very much, Larry, and members of this very
interesting symposium that we are having here. Judge Lazer, I
was very interested in your comment about Judge Ciparick's
dissenting from her own majority opinion. After listening to the
comments about some of the cases that the New York Court of
Appeals has handed down in recent years, many of which I wrote
the opinions for, I think that perhaps I should have gone both
ways on those, too. A good way to be sure you are right is to
write the opinion and then dissent from it. As a matter of fact,
Judge Simons and I did that many years ago in a case named CPC
International,Inc. v. McKesson Corp.1

So there is a precedent for it, and there is also another very
interesting precedent which you may or may not know about, the
case of McCleske, v. Kemp.2 This five to four decision upheld
the Georgia Death Penalty Statute in 1987 against dissents written

' 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 579 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987). In CPC, the
Court of Appeals held that there was "no implied private cause of action" for
securities fraud under state and federal antifraud statutes. Id. at 275, 514
N.E.2d at 118, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 806. Judge Hancock wrote the majority
opinion, but he and Judge Simons disagreed with the majority, arguing that the
legislative intent of the state antifraud statute was "not to grant various powers
to the Attorney General," but to deter securities fraud. Id. at 277, 514 N.E.2d
at 119, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 807. Judges Hancock and Simons stated that they
would find "an implied private cause of action that broadens the statutory
purpose." Id.
2 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, a black defendant was convicted in
Georgia state court of the murder of a white police officer. Id. at 283. In the
sentencing phase, the jury found two aggravating factors to warrant the
sentence of death, that it was committed during another felony, and that it was
committed against a police officer on duty. Id. at 284-85. The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. at 285. He filed a
writ for habeas corpus in Federal District Court, and cited a study prepared by
Professors David C. Baldus and other scholars. This study claimed to
demonstrate a disparity in the application of the death penalty "based on the
race of the murder victim, and, to a lesser extent, the race of the defendant."
Id. at 286.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 3 [1998], Art. 9

718

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

by Justice Brennan, 3 and Justice Blackmun,' based on the Eighth
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, 7 and he
3 .Id. at 320-45 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that the
Baldus study was accurate, and that the death sentence violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He asserted
that "a system that features a significant probability that sentencing decisions
are influenced by impermissible considerations cannot be regarded as rational.
Id. at 323 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Baldus study, in his view, indicated
that once several nonracial factors were considered, the jury was more likely
to have spared the defendant's life if his victim had been black. Id. at 325
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 345-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun admonished the
majority for departing from "well-developed constitutional jurisprudence."
Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This amendment requires that "[n]o State
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
7 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 282-320. The Court, per Justice Powell, held that
McCleskey had no standing to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause had been violated, because the Baldus study he offered,
though it cited evidence of racial disproportion in the application of the death
penalty, did not prove that he was discriminated against personally on the basis
of race. Id. at 292-93. His own expert testified that the statistics of the Baldus
study only stated that murderers of white victims were more likely to receive
the death penalty on the average. Id. at 293 n. 11. The majority also rejected
the argument that the study alone gave rise to an inference of discriminatory
intent, because death penalty verdicts are handed down by a different jury in
each trial, and that jury must decide the sentence based on many factors that
vary according to the particular defendant. Id. at 293-94. The Court held that
prosecutors should not have to account for their "wide discretion" by
explaining their reasons for seeking the death penalty. Id. at 296. The
majority went on to reject McCleskey's Eighth Amendment argument, because
capital punishment was not considered "cruel and unusual punishment" by
contemporary standards. Id. at 300. This issue had already been decided in
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), where the Court held that the death
penalty was part of Anglo-American legal tradition. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at
301. Additionally, the essence of federalism was to let a state legislature
determine its own penalty, and therefore the death penalty for murder was not
unconstitutional. Id. at 301-02 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186-97). Lastly,
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has recently declared publicly in his memoirs that if he were to
hear McCleskey v. Kemp again, he would vote the other way with

the dissenters.8 So there is precedent for it.
The New York State Death Penalty Statute was adopted on
September 1, 1995.10 There are numerous bases for constitutional
I will enumerate a few of them.
attacks on this statute.
Obviously, one is that the statute offends the Cruel and Unusual
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution" and Article I, section 5 of the New York State
Constitution.'2 The argument there is that the punishment is
inhumane, ghoulish, unbearably cruel, and that it offends
contemporary standards of human decency. There is another
basic argument that death as a punishment is disproportionate,
13
and there are cases that would back that up.
since Gregg was decided, death penalty statutes have been limited so as to
bifurcate the jury, require the jury to find at least one aggravating
circumstance before imposing the death penalty, and allow for the defendant to
introduce any mitigating circumstances to persuade the jury not to impose it.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 302 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-64). Moreover,
the Georgia statute at issue was amended to provide for an automatic appeal.
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 303. Lastly, there was "a required threshold below
which the death penalty [could] not be imposed." Id. at 305.
8 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451-52 (1994). In
an interview with his former clerk, Justice Powell expressed regret for his
ruling, and stated that he felt the death penalty was unconstitutional as a matter
of law. Id. at 451. Justice Powell also stated that death penalty was useless,
and could not be fairly enforced. Id. at 452.
9 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1995).
I 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1, § 2 (1995).
"U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII, § 2.
12 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5.
11 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Payne, the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment places certain limits on a state's imposition of the
death penalty. Id. at 824. There is a "threshold below which the death
penalty cannot be imposed," meaning that it cannot be imposed for any other
crime but first degree murder. Id. (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
305-06 (1987)). Additionally, "a societal consensus that the death penalty is
disproportionate to a particular offense prevents a state from imposing the
death penalty for that offense." Payne, 501 U.S. at 824. See also Richmond
v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40 (1992). In Riclunond, the Court held that Arizona's
"especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" aggravating factor was facially
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There is also a basis for a due process attack on the Death
Penalty Statute. It offends fundamental rights, such as the right
to life and the right not to be sentenced to death arbitrarily or
capriciously. Because it offends those fundamental rights, the

state must show a compelling interest and it must also show that
its means of fulfilling that compelling interest are the least
restrictive. The argument, of course, is that there are ways of
achieving the accepted justifications for punishment other than
executing the defendant.
The other two attacks on the statute are the United States v.
Jackson4 issue, and the McCleskey v. Kemp 5 issue. First, United
States v. Jackson. As you probably all know, the only way that a
defendant may be convicted of first-degree murder in New York
under this new Death Penalty Statute 6 is by a jury verdict. 7
There are two steps to the trial. First is the guilt phase." If the
defendant is found guilty, then the punishment phase begins, and

vague, so the sentencing judge contravened the Eighth Amendment in
considering it. Id. at 47-48; Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993). In
Graham, the Court cited Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), to
demonstrate the competing ends of the Eighth Amendment that the Court had
tried to reconcile. Graham, 506 U.S. at 468. States must control the
discretion allotted to judges and juries to ensure the death sentences are not
given out randomly, but states must also give the sentencer enough discretion
to take account of defendant's character and circumstances. Id.
14390 U.S. 570 (1967).
"s481 U.S. 279 (1987).
16 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1995). This statute provides:
When a person is convicted of murder in the first degree . . . the
court shall, in accordance with the provisions of section 400.27 of
the criminal procedure law, sentence the defendant to death, to life
imprisonment without parole ...or to a term of imprisonment for a
class A-1 felony other than a sentence of life imprisonment ....

Id.

N.Y. CRUM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney 1995). This statute
provides that after a defendant has been convicted of first degree murder, a
separate sentencing proceeding shall be conducted to determine whether the
defendant shall receive the death sentence, or be imprisoned for life without
parole. See id. § 400.27(1). The court shall use "the jury that found the
defendant guilty" to conduct this proceeding. See id. § 400.27(2).
"8See id. § 400.27(1).
17
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the jury must determine whether the defendant will be sentenced
to life imprisonment without parole or sentenced to death.19 The
only way the defendant can receive the death sentence is by the
jury's verdict.
Second, you should know that up until September 1, 1995, it
was prohibited for a defendant charged with first degree murder
to plead guilty. 0 The Death Penalty Law included three
amendments of the Criminal Procedure Law under which it
became possible for the first time for a defendant to enter a guilty
plea with the permission of the court and the consent of the
prosecutor.2' As a result, in New York, the only way that a
defendant convicted of first degree murder can escape the death
sentence is if he waives his constitutional right to a jury trial to
defend himself in a criminal proceeding, and his right not to
incriminate himself.
This provision is the only one of its kind in any of the states
that now have Death Penalty Statutes." All the research that

19 See

id. § 400.27(2).

20 N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 220.10(5)(e) (McKinney 1980) (amended
1995). This provision stated: "A defendant may not plead guilty to the crime
of murder in the first degree." Id.
The
21 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.I0(5)(e) (McKinney 1995).
amendment provides that:
[A] defendant may enter such a plea with both the permission of the
court and the consent of the people when the agreed upon sentence
is either life imprisonment without parole or a term of imprisonment
for the class A-1 felony of murder in the first degree other than a
sentence of life imprisonment without parole.
Id. See also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.30(3)(b)(vii) (McKinney
1995); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.60(2)(a) (McKinney 1995)
(providing that a defendant may change his plea from not guilty to guilty,
subject to § 220.10(5)(e)).
2 See TEx. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 1.13(b)(West 1997). This provision
states that:
In a capital felony case in which the attorney representing the State
notifies the court and the defendant that it will not seek the death
penalty, the defendant may waive the right to trial by jury but only
if the attorney representing the State, in writing and in open court,
consents to the waiver.
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many people have done has revealed no comparable statute.
Many of the states have statutes providing that if the defendant
pleads guilty, he can also be sentenced to death on the
recommendation of the jury. 23 So, in my opinion, and in the
opinion of two judges in New York State who have ruled on this
precise issue, this statute is unconstitutional because it imposes an
unconstitutional burden on a defendant by using the risk of death
as the threat to compel the defendant to waive constitutional
rights. And it is unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution
on the basis of the case of Jackson.24
United States v. Jackson came down in 1967, and it involved
the Lindbergh Law, the Federal Kidnapping Law.25 Under this
law, the only way that a defendant could be sentenced to death
would be on the recommendation of the jury.26 The defendant

Id. See also TEX. CRlM. P. CODE ANN. § 1.14(a)(West 1997) (providing
that while a defendant in any other criminal trial may waive his legal
rights, but in a death-penalty case the defendant may only waive his
rights as permitted in Article 1.13(b)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-89-108(a)
(Michie 1997) (providing that trial by jury cannot be waived by a capital
defendant); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.006 (West 1997) (providing that "a
defendant ... found guilty of murder in the first degree after a jury trial
in which the state has not waived the death penalty ... may not waive a

jury trial ....").
23 See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law Co-op. 1997) (providing that where
trial by jury is waived, or where defendant pleads guilty, the judge will decide
the sentence). See also IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (Michie 1997) (providing that
if the trial was a bench trial, or a plea of guilty was entered, only the judge
will conduct the sentencing hearing); NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.552 (1997)
(providing that if the defendant is convicted on a guilty plea, the penalty phase
of the trial is conducted before a three-judge panel); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2929.03(C)(2)(b)(I) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (providing that the penalty shall be
imposed by "the panel of three judges that tried the offender upon the
offender's waiver of the right to trial by jury.").
24 390 U.S. 570 (1967).
1 Id. at 570-71. The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), imposes the penalty of
death, or of any prison term, for transporting a kidnap victim interstate. Id.
26 Id. at 572. The Court construed the statute narrowly, observing that the
language is of the jury, not a jury. The Government argued that a jury could
still impose a death penalty on the defendant, even if he pled guilty. Id. at
577-78. The legislative history did not reveal intent to allow a "strangely
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could avoid any risk of the death sentence either by waiving a
trial by jury or by pleading guilty." The unanimous holding of

the United States Supreme Court in Jackson, is as follows:
Under the Federal Kidnapping Act therefore, the defendant
who abandons the right to contest his guilt before ajury is
assured that he cannot be executed. The defendant ingenuous
enough to seek a jury acquittal stands forewarned that if the
jury finds him guilty and does not wish to spare his life, he will

die2O
The inevitable effect of this provision is, of course, to
discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead
guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to
demand a jury trial.? There is no question that in Jackson, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that that provision was
unnecessary, that writing the statute differently could have
obviated the denials?. The Court also noted that:
In some states .
the choice between life imprisonment
and capital punishment is left to the jury in every case,

regardless of how the defendant's guilt has been
determined. Given the availability of this and other
alternatives, it is clear that the selective Death Penalty

Provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act cannot be justified
bifurcated" jury to impose a death sentence following a guilty plea or a bench
trial. Id. at 578.
27 Id. at 571. The statute does not impose the death penalty on "a defendant
who waives the right to jury trial or...one who pleads guilty." Id.
21 Id. at 581.
29 Id. "The goal of limiting the death penalty to cases in which a jury
recommends it is entirely a legitimate one. But that goal cannot be achieved
without penalizing those defendants who plead guilty and demand a jury trial."
Id. at 582.
30 Id. at 572. The court stated that:
Mhe death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act imposes
an impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional right,
but we think that provision is severable from the remainder of the
statute. There is no reason to invalidate the law in its entirety simply
because its capital punishment clause violates the Constitution.
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by its ostensible purpose. Jackson held the death sentence
provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act unconstitutional
on the face of the statute.31
I doubt that there is any way that Jackson cannot apply, or can
be distinguished in its applicability in this case. I think that
statement is proven to be correct because of a decision of the
New York State Court of Appeals, People v. Michael A. C.32 The
Court of Appeals, in a decision by Chief Judge Fuld, was faced
with a Jackson issue. A statute provided that any defendant who
wanted to get youthful offender treatment had to give up the right
to have a jury trial, and agree to a bench trial. 3
The Court of Appeals unanimously held as follows:
The defendant in the case before us would not have been
subject to the death penalty had he consented to a nonjury
trial, as in Jackson, but he certainly would have been
exposed to a considerably longer period of imprisonment
than he could receive if he was prosecuted as a youthful
offender.3 4

We do not mean to imply by this that the

defendant's consent was necessarily rendered involuntary
by the statutory scheme. However, a procedure that offers
an individual a reward for waiving their fundamental
constitutional right or imposes a harsher penalty for
asserting it, may not be sustained under Jackson.
So, I think the argument on the federal side is very compelling.

at 582-83.
32 27 N.Y.2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 620, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1970). In Michael
A. C., the Court of Appeals reviewed two cases in which each defendant was
tried "without a jury, and adjudicated a youthful offender." Id. at 82, 261
N.E.2d at 622, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
13 Id. at 82, 261 N.E.2d at 622, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 697. The statute (Code
31Id.

Crim. Proc. § 913-g) required a defendant "between the ages of 16 and 19 to

consent to a trial without a jury in order to render him eligible for youthful
offender treatment .

. . ."

Michael A.C., 27 N.Y.2d at 82, 261 N.E.2d at

622, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
34Id. at 86, 261 N.E.2d at 624, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01.

" Id. at 86, 261 N.E.2d at 624-25, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
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Many states courts since Jackson have come down with
decisions under their own State Constitutions finding their Death
Penalty Statutes similar New York's unconstitutional.? Many
states since Jackson came down have revised their Death Penalty
Statutes to comply with Jackson. New York has the only Death
Penalty Statute that seems to directly conflict with Jackson."

' See Washington v. Frampton, 627 P.2d 922 (1981). In Frampton, the
Washington Supreme Court agreed with the Jackson holding, and stated that
where "the death penalty is imposed upon conviction following a plea of not
guilty and a trial, but is not imposed when there is a plea of guilty, that statute
is unconstitutional." Id. at 926. See also Massachusetts v. Colon-Cruz, 470
N.E.2d 116, 129 n. 31 (1984) (holding that Massachusetts' death penalty law
was "more burdensome than the clause invalidated in Jackson.").
I See People v. McIntosh, 173 Misc. 2d 727, 662 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Co. Ct.
Dutchess County 1997). In McIntosh, the court distinguished the New York
statute from the Federal Kidnapping Statute, on the grounds that New York's
statute required consent of the prosecutor and the judge for a guilty plea, while
the federal statute did not. Id. at 729, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216. This protects the
state's policy of controlling when the death penalty will and will not be
imposed. Id. at 729-30, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216. The court also held that the
guilty plea was a "vital part of the criminal justice system," and provides
"prompt resolution of criminal proceedings with all the benefits that enure
from final disposition." Id. at 730, 662 N.Y.S.2d at 216-17 (citing People v.
Seaberg, 74 N.Y.2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 1022, 543 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1989)).
Additionally, preventing a defendant from pleading guilty in the face of the
"risk of death" continues New York's long-standing policy against permitting
defendants to "plead guilty to a crime... punishable by death." Id. at 731.
622 N.Y.S.2d at 217. But see People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661
N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997). In Hale, defendant argued that
the guilty plea provisions of the statute "effectively penalize[d] his right to a
fair trial." Id. at 178, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 478. The Hale court cited to United
States v. Jackson for the proposition that when the death penalty is not applied
after a guilty plea, it penalizes the defendant for exercising his constitutional
rights. Id. at 178-79. 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479. The Hale court thus held that:
It is apparent that New York's death penalty statute, likewise,
provides for the imposition of the death penalty only upon
recommendation of the jury; the provisions governing pleas in
capital cases in New York expressly forbid the imposition of the
death penalty upon a plea of guilty

. . .

and a defendant may not

waive a jury trial where the crime charged may be punishable by
death. Only if the defendant insists upon exercising his sixth
amendment right to a jury trial and his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination does he risk death. Therefore, unless
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Assume that the New York state court chooses not to follow
Jackson, for some reason. There are some arguments that could
be made that Jackson should not be followed. There is an
extremely compelling state constitutional basis for a state court to
depart from Jackson and give greater protection under the State
Constitution. I think this will be interesting because it will tie
right in with some of the theory that you have heard, I'm sure,
from Judge Simons and others on state constitutional analysis.
Consider the right to trial by jury. In New York, Article I,
section 2 of the New York State Constitution says, "[t]rial by
jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by
constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever." 38 Those
words have been in the New York State Constitution since 1777,
fourteen years before the first Congress of the United States
adopted the Bill of Rights. This wording is entirely different
from the Sixth Amendment. In the Sixth Amendment all it says
about trial by jury is that " [t]he accused shall enjoy the right to a
New York's law may be distinguished from the act in question in
Jackson, this court is bound to find the plea provisions to be
unconstitutional.
Id. at 179-80, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 479-80 (citations omitted). However, this
holding was set aside in Hynes v. Tomei, 237 A.D.2d 52, 666 N.Y.S.2d
687 (2d Dep't), rev'g People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d
457 (1997).
The Appellate Division, Second Department, in a
declaratory judgment, held that New York's death penalty statute was
distinguishable from the statute at issue in Jackson because the jury was
not bifurcated, and did not balance the aggravating factors against the
mitigating circumstances. Hynes, 237 A.D.2d at 57-58, 666 N.Y.S.2d at
690-91. The reviewing court also cited to Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970), which also concerned the Federal Kidnapping Act, to
hold that "a guilty plea is not invalid merely because entered to avoid the
possibility of a death penalty." Hynes, 237 A.D.2d at 59, 666 N.Y.S.2d
at 691. The Second Department also cited to New York case law
upholding the validity of plea bargaining, and reiterated its own prior
holding that only the Court of Appeals can provide broader constitutional
rights under the State Constitution. See People v. Keta, 165 A.D.2d 172,
567 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dep't 1991), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1992).
38 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
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speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and the
district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... -3 The

right to trial by jury in the Sixth Amendment is one of many
enumerated rights in the Sixth Amendment. 0" In the New York
State Constitution, by contrast, the right to trial by jury is the sole
This section contains
issue addressed in the provision .4
meticulous provisions with respect to how a trial by jury may be
waived in a criminal case.42 This was added in 1937.41
A defendant in all criminal cases may waive a jury trial by a
written instrument signed "by the defendant in person in open
court before and with the approval of a judge or justice of a court
having jurisdiction to try the offense."" The State Constitution
contains this provision which is critical: "A jury trial may be
waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in
which the crime charged may be punishable by death. "4s Thus,
waiver of a jury trial is expressly prohibited in a capital case
where the guilty verdict may result in execution.
So using an interpretive analysis, you can see from the
differences in wording between Article I, section 2 and the jury
trial right in the Sixth Amendment and particularly the emphatic
language in Article I, section 2-i.e., "shall remain forever
inviolate" that the framers of the New York Constitution in
177741 attached particular importance to an accused's right to a
jury trial. There is also a strong indication that the drafters of the
39

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

' Id. The Sixth Amendment also provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall... be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Id.
41N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2.
42 Id. Article I, § 2 provides that: "A jury trial may be waived by the
defendant in person in open court before and with the approval of a judge or
of a court having jurisdiction to try the offense." Id.
justice
43

id.

Id.
"
4s
Id. (emphasis added).
46 id.
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amended version of Article I, section 2 in 193747 has a particular
concern for protecting the right of a defendant to a jury in a
capital case because of the express provision against waiving a
jury trial in capital cases.
Judge Brennan:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Mr. Quinn:

I have the ability to stand here and say one thing and sit down,
because of the rule of law, that the death penalty statute of the
State of New York is presumed constitutional. 8 I do not think I
should do that. Some people may ask what the Attorney General
has to do with death penalty cases as well. We are presently
involved in a number of death penalty cases. The other reason
that the Attorney General is involved is that under § 71 of the
Executive Law, the New York Attorney General is required to
defend the constitutionality of a statute of the State of New
York.49 That is what brings us into most of the cases.
47

N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2 (amended 1937).

See People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735
(1977).
49 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1993). This statute states in pertinent
48

part:

Whenever the constitutionality of a statute is brought into
question upon the trial or hearing of any action or
proceeding, civil or criminal, in any court of record of
original or appellate jurisdiction, the court or justice before
whom such action or proceeding is pending, may make an
order, directing the party desiring to raise such question, to
serve notice thereof on the attorney-general and that the
attorney-general be permitted to appear at any such trial or
hearing in support of the constitutionality of such statute.

The court or justice before whom any such action or
proceeding is pending may also make such order upon the
application of any action or proceeding upon motion of the
attorney-general. When such order has been made in any
manner herein mentioned it shall be the duty of the attorney-
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We are presently involved on the trial level in a number of
cases; one in Essex County, a murder for hire case, and one in a

Schoharie County, also a murder for hire case. These two cases
are awaiting a decision whether to seek the death penalty. There
is a case pending in Dutchess County, and we have a person
sitting at the table awaiting a trial for that case as well.
As I said, there is a strong presumption of constitutionality that
must be overcome, 50 and if I could ask for a vote now, I could
figure out whether I would have to proceed or not. The burden is
upon my colleague here to show beyond a reasonable doubt that
the statute is unconstitutional.'
The presumption of
constitutionality in the death penalty comes under People v.
Davis,2 a 1977 Court of Appeals case.? A court could only

strike down the statute only as a measure of last resort.,,
Judge Hancock spoke about an interpretive versus a noninterpretive analysis. 5 In the non-interpretive analysis all that has
to be shown is that there are some facts that the legislature relied
upon in passing the statute and some rational reason for so
general to appear in such action or proceeding in support of
the constitutionality of such statute.

Id.
" See People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1997). "In reviewing the constitutionality of the law, the court is
mindful that legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality." Id. at 166, 471.
"' Id. "The party challenging the provision must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the statute violates a constitutional requirement." Id.
52 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977).
53 Id. at 30. "We should not allow our personal preferences as to the
wisdom of legislative action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our
judicial decision in cases such as these. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
411 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
I Id. "[Tihe State statutes under scrutiny carry with them a strong
presumption of constitutionality, that they will be stricken as unconstitutional
only as a last resort and that courts may not substitute their judgment for that
of the Legislature as the wisdom and expediency of the legislation." Id.
51 Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 167, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 472. "First, the court must
undertake an interpretive analysis of the constitutional provision in question,
focusing on whether the text of the State Constitution specifically recognizes
rights not enumerated in the federal Constitution." Id.
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doing. 6 In New York State, the rational reasons used and
adopted by the legislature are that the death penalty is both a
deterrent and there is a reasonable inference for retribution
against the defendant. 7
The analysis with respect to the argument of cruel and unusual
punishment has been addressed by the Court of Appeals in the
5 8 In Broadie, the Court of Appeals
case People v. Broadie.

declined to adopt a greater protection under the State Constitution
under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.59
The
interpretive analysis that the Judge spoke about is applied in the
constitutional provisions when there is no difference between the
State and Federal Constitution. 6° As the judge also said, we are
in the middle of a division amongst the trial level courts.
The first court that will be making a decision, hopefully, is
Justice Tomei, in the Second Department, who has ruled that the

discretionary portion with respect to plea bargaining to avoid
imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutional.61

He has

56 Id. "Second, the court must apply a 'non-interpretive' analysis, which
'proceeds from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice, and fundamental
fairness."' Id. (citation omitted).
-1Id. at 173-74, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 476. "Although retribution is not a valid
penological goal standing alone, it may, along with deterrence, constitute one
of the ends of the penal law." Id. at 174, 661 N.Y.S. 2d at 476.
5 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975).
59 Id. at 118-19, 332 N.E.2d at 346-47, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 483.
60 See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall
witnesses e unreasonably detained." Id. See also People v. Hale, 173 Misc.
2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997). "Justice Tomei
pointed out that:
Because the relevant text of Article I, § 5 is the same as that of the
eighth amendment, and arose from the same historical context,
interpretive analysis leads us to the conclusion that the text of
Article I, § 5 provides no basis for interpreting New York's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment any differently
from that of the eighth amendment.
Id. at 167, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
61 See People v. Hale, 173 Misc.2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct.
Kings
County 1997). Under New York's death penalty statute, a plea of guilty in
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upheld the rest of the statute and the Severability Clause of that
statute, and he has said that the statute shall stand without the plea
provision.6
In Er rel Kemmler, the Court of Appeals
determined that capital punishment is "authorized and justified by
a law, adopted by the people as a means to the end of better
security of our society. It is not cruel and unusual with the sense
and meaning of the Constitution."*' In the adoption of the new
Death Penalty Statute in 1995, the legislative history shows that
every effort was made to make this statute comply with all of the
Supreme Court cases.Y Obviously, it was left for a final decision
by our Court of Appeals.
The Judge talks about the potential for ghoulish and wanton
application of our Death Penalty Statute. Looking at the current
figures, and presuming approximately two thousand murders in
New York State per year, the death penalty statute has limited
death penalty eligible cases. Since the first of September, 1995,
there have been one hundred twenty two cases in which
defendants have been charged with murder in the first degree.
To date obviously, there have been no convictions after trial,
other than in cases where the District Attorney or the prosecutor
have not sought the death penalty. 6

capital cases precludes imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 179, 661
N.Y.S.2d at 479. However, a defendant may only plead guilty in capital cases
upon consent of the District Attorney and permission of the court. Id. at 178,
661 N.Y.S.2d at 478. Furthermore, New York does not allow death-eligible
defendants to waive their right to jury trial; therefore, the death penalty may
only be imposed upon the recommendation of the jury. Id. at 179, 661
N.Y.S.2d at 479.
62 Id. at 186, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
6 119 N.Y. 580, 24 N.E. 9 (1890).
(Ad.at 586, 24 N.E. at 11.
I Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 193, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 488. "[Ihe death penalty
statute was formulated and enacted in the wake of several United States
Supreme Court decisions . . . ; the Legislature most certainly took these
decisions into account in drafting the statute, and intended the terms of the
statute to be consistent with them." Id.
' People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 176, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 477 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1997).
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New York State also goes further than the federal requirement
in terms of the age of the defendant. 6 The federal interpretation
permits a death penalty in a case of a sixteen or seventeen year
old defendant.6 New York uses the eighteen year old rule, and it
is only in cases of intentional murder, with the aggravating
factors that must be proven by the people.69
The other factor that we have taken into consideration that the
70
Judge spoke about was the bifurcation of the penalty phase.
New York has also provided for the direct review of a conviction
to the Court of Appeals. 71 The Court of Appeals also has the
obligation to review any conviction in terms of any other
defendant similarly situated. - I do not know how it would be
handled with respect to the first case that gets to the Court of
Appeals if there is a conviction and death sentence.
There are also certain circumstances where the defendant, after
a conviction, is given the ability to show why he should not be

Id. "New York's legislation provides for all these protections and more."
Id.at 166, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 471.
6 See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (Supp. 1998).
69 Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 166, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 471. Justice Tomei noted:
New York goes beyond the requirements mandated by the Supreme
Court by requiring that defendants be at least eighteen years old to
be eligible for capital punishment; limiting death penalty eligible
felony murders to those in which the defendant either intentionally
killed the victim or commanded the killing; and prohibiting
execution of the mentally retarded.
Id.
at 166 n.17, 661 N.Y.S.2d at471 n.17.
70 Hynes v. Tomei, 666 N.Y.S.2d 667, 691 (2d Dep't 1997). New York's
statute provides for a bifurcated trial proceeding where guilt and sentencing are
determined separately by the jury. Id.
7,See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3(b). Article VI, § 3(b) of the New York
State Constitution provides in pertinent part: "Appeals to the court of appeals
may be taken . . . [i]n criminal cases, directly from a court of original
jurisdiction where the judgment is of death." Id.
' Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 166, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 471. New York's legislation,
in keeping with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Gregg v. Georgia,
requires a determination of "whether the sentence in the particular case is
disproportionate to those sentences imposed insimilar cases ....." Id.
67
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put to death with respect to mitigation.73 There is much written
about the role of the defense lawyer being able to, midstream, get
a verdict against him and then turn to a social work type of
position where he has to show his client to be a much more
favorable person, basically requesting leniency. The Supreme
Court also requires a second penalty phase.
It gives the
defendant much more latitude than the prosecutor, by permitting
the defendant to use reliable hearsay evidence to show the nature
of the defendant, while only permitting the prosecutor to rebut
that particular evidence. The prosecutor does not go forward,
rather the defendant goes forward and sums up last at the penalty
phase.
There is also some discussion, and also an article written by
Judge Hancock with respect to the alleged racial discrimination in
the application of the death penalty. 7 I do not know of any
studies that are available. The latest study in New York State
that is available ended in 1963.Y It found that of the last thirteen
people that were executed, only one was a white person. 76 I do
not believe that the use of that study is valid in New York State in
1997. Obviously, we would be arguing against anything of that
nature. We have not had it since. I think 1963 was one of the
last executions.7 There is also the McCleskey case that the Judge
spoke about. 7 The court found the study in that case to be flawed
See People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735
(1977). "It is essential only 'that the capital sentencing decision allow for
consideration of whatever mitigating circumstances may be relevant to either
the particular offender or the particular offense." Id. at 44, 371 N.E.2d at
471, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (citing Roberts v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637
(1977)).
74 See Steward F. Hancock et al., Race, UnbridledDiscretion, and the State
Constitutional Validity of New York's Death Penalty Statute - Two Questions.
59 ALB. L. REV. 1545 (1996).
1 Id. at 1558-59. The study "shows that eighty percent of those executed in
New York between 1890 and 1963 were African Americans, even though they
represented
only 8.45 percent of the state population." Id.
76
71

ld. at 1559.

7

Id. at 1558.
1 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). However, "Justice Powell,
author of the majority opinion in McCleskey has publicly stated that he would
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as well, and permitted the states to have a constitutionally
permissible range of discretion. 9 By limiting the cases that are
death penalty eligible, the New York State legislation and the
Governor have reduced the number of cases and put limitations
on the cases that will proceed under the Murder in the First
Degree Statute.8"
The Judge also spoke with respect to equal protection. I am
sorry, I would rather move into the area of prosecutorial
discretion. I think that is going to be one of the challenges that
the Judge refers to, and it is the issue that was the underlying
issue in People v. Hale,"'the case that will be argued on appeal in
the Second Department. If you compare other statutes in the
State of New York, there are times when the discretion of the
prosecutor is limited. However in this instance, the defendants
have taken the position that this gives the prosecutor unbridled
discretion to make the decision with respect to whether to charge
or not.u That responsibility and that discretion is protected under
a Supreme Court ruling which respects the prosecutor's charging
decision.83 The difference in New York, focuses on the waiver of
the right to a jury trial, and the last point made by his Honor with
respect to that was that New York State's Constitution prohibits
now change his vote and join the dissenters." Hancock, supra note 74, at
1558.
" Id. "Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is
involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious." Id. at
313.
80 See People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1997). A capital punishment statute must "genuinely narrow the class
of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonable justify the
imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others
found guilty of murder." Id. at 157-58, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
81 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1997).
82 Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at 165 n.16, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 471 n.16.
Defendant
claims that "C.P.L. § 250.40 gives unfettered discretion to prosecutors to seek
the death penalty .... " Id.
83 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987).
"It is wellestablished that the prosecutor may be entrusted with charging decisions, and
the exercise of that discretion in the context of capital cases, unless proved to
be for an invidious purpose, is not unconstitutional." Hale, 173 Misc. 2d at
177, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 478.
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the waiver of the right to a jury trial." I do not know how that
will square with respect to the inviolate right of a jury trial. I
think that will be argued next week and we will see how the case
comes out.8
With respect to plea bargaining, there is no absolute right to
plea bargaining.6 That has never been found, I do not believe, in
any court. It is a tool that is used by the prosecutor with respect
to the cases placed before him or her, and that rule, the power
given to that prosecutor and the discretion given to that
prosecutor, is given again in the capital caseY Part of the reason
and rationale to provide the prosecutor with that discretion is to
prevent a defendant from saying, "My life is over I want to
commit suicide and I want to go and receive the death penalty."
Obviously, there would be a limited number of times when
something like that would occur, but the state has an interest in
preventing that from occurring.
There is also, in death penalty cases, discussion about death

qualified jurorsY I would prefer to call them "fairness qualified
jurors."

In the voir dire, we go through much greater steps in

terms of determining whether somebody is qualified to sit on a
84See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2. Article I, § 2 provides in pertinent part: "A
jury trial may be waived by the defendant in all criminal cases, except those in
which the crime charged may be punishable by death .
Id.
I..."
' See Hynes v. Tomei, 661 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1997). This case was
decided December 22, 1997 and reversed Justice Tomei's earlier ruling that
the plea provisions are unconstitutional and should be stricken from the statute.
Id.
11 Id. at 693. "[IUt provides a means where, by mutual concessions, the
parties may obtain a prompt resolution of criminal proceedings with all the
benefits that inure from final disposition." Id.
87 N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 220.30 (3)(b)(vii). This section provides: "A
defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of murder in the first
degree... provided, however, that a defendant may enter such a plea with
both the permission of the court and the consent of the people." See also
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987). "[A] capital punishment
system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency 'would be totally
alien to our notions of criminal justice.'" Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976)).
81 See generally Mary Falk et al., Rights and Freedoms Under the State
Constitution, 13 Totmo L. REv. 59, 73-82 (1996).
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particular case.8 9 The intent is to remove those jurors that are
"unwilling to exercise their rights to say a person should be put
to death," from those who would never, and those who would

always.' It takes those people out of the jury pool, and puts
those open-minded people in, in an attempt to remove any
potential prejudice to the defendant. 9

Under equal protection, there is a discussion with respect to
strict scrutiny. I do not believe that to be the test. As I said
before, there is a rational basis or a legitimate state purpose for
this statute.' The statute has been, and should be upheld. Those
legitimate state purposes are deterrence and retribution; although,

it has been argued that these are not legitimate state purposes. As
I said earlier, under that particular statute there are Court of

89 Id.

at 77-78. Ms. Falk explains:
[W]hat the statute means by death qualification is that potential
jurors who pronounce themselves unable to impose the death penalty
can and will be challenged for cause and will be struck from the
jury before the guilt determination phase. Therefore, people who
could not impose the death penalty at the separate sentencing phase
can not sit at the guilt determination phase."

Id.

90 See N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20 (1)(f) (McKinney 1995). This
statute states in pertinent part:
A challenge for cause is an objection to a prospective juror and may
be made on the ground that . . . [t]he crime charged may be
punishable by death and the prospective juror entertains such
conscientious opinions either against or in favor of such punishment
as to preclude such juror from rendering an impartial verdict or
from properly exercising the discretion conferred upon such juror
by law ......
Id.
9"People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 190, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 486 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1997). "The purpose of the statute is to insure an impartial
verdict, the touchstone of any jury trial. No method has been suggested to
supplant death qualification in achieving that essential goal." Id.
9 See Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1004 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that
legislative classifications that may result in the death penalty do not require a
higher level of scrutiny than rational basis).
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Appeals rulings with respect to it not violating the equal
protection clause.93
The Judge also spoke with respect to the right to life. I do not
believe that we have a constitutional right to life. I do not think
we have a case that has so held thus far. I do have a provision
here. I think the best position from the people, is a legislative
declaration under the Human Rights Law: "The state has the
responsibility to act to assure that every individual within the state
is afforded an equal opportumity to enjoy a full and productive
life, and the failure to provide such equal opportunity, whether
because of discrimination, prejudice, etcetera .

."5 Well, I

think the greater argument can be made in 1997, that the victim
had the right to a full and productive life as well.

I Hancock, supra note 74, at 1568. "Indeed, it was precisely because this
proof of discrimination could not be made that the Supreme Court in
McCleskey dismissed the equal protection challenge . . . this holding in
McCleskey prevents a successful equal protection attack against the statute
under the federal constitution." Id.
I See People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1997). The court pointed out that:
It is enough to say that there is no support in the federal or state
constitution or any other source of Anglo-American law, for the
claim that the convicted perpetrator of a particularly atrocious
murder enjoys an unqualified right to life notwithstanding the
legislature's rational determination that the only appropriate sanction
for the defendant's egregious conduct is death.
Id. at 175, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
95 N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1993). This statute states in pertinent
part:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the state has the
responsibility to act to assure that every individual within this state
is afforded an equal opportunity to enjoy a full and productive life
and that the failure to provide such equal opportunity, whether
because of discrimination, prejudice, intolerance or inadequate
education, training, housing or health care not only threatens the
rights and proper privileges of its inhabitants but menaces the
institutions and foundation of a free democratic state and threatens
its inhabitants.
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The issue specifically addressed in United States v. Jackson9 is

the discretion of the prosecutor. The argument made at trial, that
I am sure will be made in the Second Department, is that there is
no waiver of a right to a jury trial permitted in our statute." As I
said earlier, it is not permitted in our Constitution as well.98 The
second position taken has been, and will be, that there is no open
plea permitted under our statute; therefore, there is no right to
that plea.99 The legislature has made a determination that they
will not permit somebody to plead guilty to it.1 ° The third
position, and probably the weakest position that has been taken,
was that the statute under Jackson called for a mandatory death
penalty.'" I Obviously, the United States Supreme Court has
struck all mandatory death penalty provisions including that of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Smith.102 These two gentlemen
may have been on the bench at the time.
Judge Hancock:

I was and I think it was in 1985, with Judge Kaye presiding.
Mr. Quinn:

The Judge had stated that the only way to escape the risk of the
death penalty is to plead to life without parole. There is also
another way to escape the death penalty, and that is to go to trial,
as intended by the statute, and be found not guilty. There are
many extra provisions put in place to protect the defendant's
rights, including the voir dire, money that is given to the Capital
U.S. 570 (1968).
9'See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 320.10 (1). This statute provides in
pertinent part: "Except where the indictment charges the crime of murder in
96390

the first degree, the defendant ...

may at any time before trial waive a jury

trial."
98 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
100 Id.
' United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1968).
102 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984).
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Defender's Association, setting up the Capital Defender's Office,
and increased fees. An argument can be made that a person not
being paid enough would not pay enough attention to a case. The
legislature and the Governor have taken that into consideration
and they have increased the amount of money to set up the
Capital Defender's Office to provide these defendants with the
rights to protect their interests. Based upon all that, I believe that
the statute would be upheld as constitutional.' 0 I do not know
that we will ever get to see the decision. Well, I will not guess
when it will happen. I am sorry to say it should happen. I do not
know when. We have yet to have one go to trial. There is a
group of attorneys in the United States, an association, that have
said that apparently the majority of people that are sitting on
death row are those people that have been offered and turned
down life without parole, and elected to go to trial and were
found guilty and sentenced to death. Thank you very much.
ProfessorRichard D. Klein:
I would like to ask questions. First of all, Mr. Quinn, I believe
you stated that there is a presumption in New York that a statute
is constitutional. But then I think you said that the person or the
party who is challenging the constitutionality of the statute must
show beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is
unconstitutional. Can you just elaborate on that and give us some
sources.

Mr. Quinn:
The burden is on the proponent who is seeking to show that
there is an unconstitutional provision.
11 See People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735
(1977).
"Whatever one thinks or capital punishment, the Legislature is
entitled to conclude, rightly or wrongly, that the death penalty serves useful
social purposes. Since the Legislature has so concluded, and has drawn a
statute that comports with constitutional requirements, the statute should be
upheld." Id. at 46, 371 N.E.2d at 472, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
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Judge Hancock:
May I comment on that question? I think that Mr. Quinn has
stated the correct rule. I think that we say the person seeking to
attack a statute has the burden of proof, we are just stating the
corollary rule that there is a presumption of constitutionality. I
think it is kind of confusing to talk about burden of proof when
you are really talking about a legal question. No one is really
faced with proving anything. There is a presumption, as we all
know, that a statute enacted by the legislature is constitutional. I
really think that is all we are talking about.
ProfessorKlein:
But Mr. Quinn had said the burden was beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Judge Hancock:
Well again, maybe that is saying there is a strong burden, but
as some learned judges have said, there are presumptions and
then there are presumptions. It depends upon how strong you
want to read the presumption.

You know, I really do not -- I

think when you are talking law, and not facts that have to be
proven, that you cannot really equate the two. That is my own
view, anyway.
ProfessorKlein:
Judge Hancock, let me ask you a question. Why is the
situation regarding pleas in the death penalty case really that
different from the typical plea bargaining situation where, indeed,
it is told to the defendant if you give up your constitutional right
to have a jury trial we will give you a benefit; you will get a
reduced sentence. Is that not really pretty much the same thing?
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Judge Hancock:
I think that it is a question of degree. As many of the cases
say, death is different.'0 4 And when you can use the risk of death
as a weapon for plea bargaining, that is different than the
ordinary kind of plea bargaining which, of course, goes on all the
time. So I think that the Jackson' 5 Court makes that clear, and
cases subsequent to Jackson I think have too. 106
Mr. Quinn:
Death is different, but there is no right to a plea bargain. Any
prosecutor could say I will not offer any plea at any time.
Obviously, they would not last in office very long if they did so,
but someone could run for office against any plea negotiations
any plea-bargaining.
ProfessorKlein:
Mr. Quinn, let me ask you a particular concern, perhaps, about
the arbitrariness issue. I think the Supreme Court has historically
looked very carefully at whether or not a certain state's
imposition of the death penalty is an arbitrary and capricious one,
and whether the state distinguishes which people are getting the
death penalty from those who do not. Do you think there is any
issue in New York State, because of the absolute discretion given
prosecutors under the New York Murder in the First Degree
law,107 to either go for the death penalty or not. That the very
14 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504 (1978). In Harris, the Court stated
"our opinions have repeatedly emphasized that death is a fundamentally
different kind of penalty from any other that society may impose." Id. at 515.
1os 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
1o See

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that North

Carolina's death sentence for first-degree murder violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
1o N.Y. PENAL LAw 60.06 (1995). This statute provides:
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sharp divergence in views amongst prosecutors in New York to
show that perhaps who gets the death penalty in New York will
result in arbitrary decisions? If someone could kill someone -Murder in the First Degree -- in the Bronx, it is unlikely,

perhaps, that that District Attorney0 8 will seek the death penalty,
but if they committed the exact same act a mile away in
Westchester, it is very likely that that District Attorney' 9 will
seek the death penalty. Do you think, therefore, there is a
problem in arbitrary enforcement of the statute in New York
State?
Mr. Quinn:

I do not know that you can label it as arbitrary enforcement.
Every District Attorney is -- and the argument is before the court
right now' -- an independently elected official to enforce the

laws of the State of New York within the bounds of discretion.
Obviously, the Court of Appeals will take all of this into
consideration -- if and when the case gets to them, and review it.

Finally, after reviewing all the cases, and I think most people in
this classroom have seen - no two cases are alike -- I do not see

that a defendant is going to have the ability to go in behind the
closed door of the decision-making process to determine what
went into that prosecutor's mind in determining whether to seek
the death penalty or not.

When a person is convicted of murder in the first degree . . . the
court shall, in accordance with the provisions of section 400.27 of the
criminal procedure law, sentence the defendant to death, to life
imprisonment without parole ...or to a term of imprisonment for a
class A-1 felony other than a sentence of life imprisonment....
lOs The District Attorney for The Bronx County is Robert T. Johnson.
'o The District Attorney for Westchester County is Jeanine Pirro.
"0 See People v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1997). In Support of the Defendant's Motion to Strike the Death
Notice, the defendant claimed that "New York's Capital Punishment
legislation is unconstitutional because [it] . . . gives unfettered discretion to
prosecutors to seek the death penalty. . . ." Id. at 165 n. 16, 661 N.Y.S.2d at
471 n. 16.
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ProfessorKlein:
Judge Hancock, do you want to comment?
Judge Hancock:
I would. That of course ties in exactly with the other
argument, the McCleskey v. Kenp" argument. You have to
understand that there is another aspect to the Cruel and Unusual
Clause in the Eighth Amendment"' and in the Comparable Clause
in Article I, section 5 the professor alluded to." 3 In Furman v.
Georgia, 114 the Supreme Court of the United States held that it
is a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth
Amendment to impose on a defendant"' a risk of being sentenced
to death arbitrarily, based on improper considerations, such as
death or race. So the imposition of a risk of that kind on a
person violates the Eighth Amendment, and in my view, Article

"1 481

U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, a black defendant was convicted in

Georgia state court of the murder of a white police officer. Id. at 283. In the
sentencing phase, the jury found two aggravating factors to warrant the
sentence of death, one that it was committed during another felony, and second
that it was committed against a police officer on duty. Id. at 284-85. The
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. Id. at
285. The defendant filed a writ for habeas corpus in Federal District Court,
and cited a study prepared by Professors David C. Baldus and other scholars
which claimed to demonstrate a disparity in the application of the death penalty
"based on the race of the murder victim, and, to a lesser extent, the race of the
defendant." Id. at 286.
112 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted". Id.
13 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
provides that "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall
witnesses be unreasonably detained." Id.
14 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
"5 ld. at 240.
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I, section 5. In Furman and in Gregg," 6 and in the subsequent
cases that followed along from Furman, the Supreme Court of the
United States looked at the statute as a whole, and looked at the
way it operated. That is the way the Supreme Court viewed the

challenges to the Death Penalty Statutes until McCleskey came
along. It was urged in McCleskey, on the basis of statistics,
which by the way, the Supreme Court of the United States
conceded were valid, that the Georgia Statute viewed as a whole
imposed arbitrary and unequal risk of being sentenced to death on
certain racial groups; specifically, on black defendants who kill
white victims would be the extreme case." 7 In McCleskey, the
Supreme Court of the United States changed its course. Instead
of looking at the statutory scheme as a whole, even though it
accepted the statistics as valid, they said no, we will not set a
death sentence aside on the basis of these factors unless you can
show specific purposeful discrimination in the actual case, either
by the prosecutor in making the critical prosecutorial decisions
which have to be made or by the jury."' Well, of course, that
imposes an impossible burden. You cannot prove it. There is no
way you can get inside the mind of the prosecutor or inside what

went on in

the jury to say, ha-ha, they intentionally

discriminated. It is impossible. The equal protection argument
made by Justice Blackmun in his dissent is similar." 9 I will not
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Petitioner, Troy Gregg, was
sentenced to death after being convicted of committing armed robbery and
murder. Id. The Supreme Court held that punishment of death for the crime
of murder did not, under all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 154. The Court held that the Georgia scheme was
constitutional. Id.
116

117

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.

118 Id.

Id. at 345-65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun admonished
the majority for departing from "well-developed constitutional jurisprudence."
Id. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He believed that McCleskey had made
the necessary showing under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(requiring a criminal defendant who alleges an equal protection violation to
prove the existence of purposeful discrimination), and met the three part test
enumerated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, (1986) and Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (requiring a defendant to establish that he is a
19
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go into it. The state constitutional analysis here is that under
Article I, section 5, the Court of Appeals and other state courts
do not have to buy into McCleskey. McCleskey has been rejected
in case after case by the highest state courts and in law review
articles.1m One article calls McCleskey the Dred Scott of death
sentence jurisprudence. 2 ' And so the Court of Appeals will have
to decide whether it wants to adopt the broader view and look at
the statutory scheme as a whole, the way Justice Brennan and
Justice Blackmun would look at it, and then decide, based on
statistics which are available. There are all sorts of statistics that
can develop the racial discrimination argument. And also there
are statistics showing, as we have just heard, that there is a
tremendous difference between whether you get convicted or
whether you are accused of a crime, let us say in Cattaraugus
County or in Manhattan or the Bronx and there is an enormous
divergence in attitudes of the prosecutors. But remember, the
prosecutors are elected officials, so there is a divergence in
attitudes among the people who vote for them and it is natural
that the prosecutors are sensitive to those attitudes. That factors
in to the arbitrariness and capricious argument which is the basis
of the cruel and unusual argument." Sorry to make such a long
answer, but I did want to talk about McCleskey.
member of a group "that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for
different treatment," make a showing that he was in fact singled out for
different treatment, and show that the alleged discriminatory procedure is
susceptible to abuse or is not racially neutral), to require the Court to overturn
the conviction.
12 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (finding that the
Pennsylvania death penalty statute comported with the Court's decisions
interpreting the Eighth Amendment).
121 See Hugo Adam Bedau, Someday McCleskey Will be the Death Penalty's
DredScott, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1987, at 13.
12 See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992) (stating "the federal
constitutional question is whether such reliance is so arbitrary or capricious as
to constitute an independent due process or eighth amendment violation");
Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1991) (stating "our eighth amendment
jurisprudence has required these states imposing capital punishment to adopt
procedural safeguards protecting against arbitrary and capricious impositions
of the death sentence. .. ").
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Mr. Quinn:
Thank you. Cited as authority by Justice Tomei, Judge
Hancock's client, "The party challenging the provision must
doubt that the statute violates a
prove beyond a reasonable
1
requirement."
constitutional
ProfessorKlein:

Mr. Quinn, you had made the point that you thought that the
requirement for a death-qualified jury was really protective of the
defendant's rights in part -- maybe if I could explain a bit about

what a death qualified jury is. The New York Law mandates that
for the jurors who are going to sit on the guilt phase of a capital
case, cannot have jurors who are anti death penalty. So if a juror
says on voir dire, "I do not believe in the death penalty, I do not
think the death penalty ought to be given in any case," they are
stricken from the jury and they cannot sit in that case. So we are
left in the guilt phase of a capital murder prosecution without any
jurors who are anti-death penalty. And I think statistics have
shown that those jurors who are pro death penalty tend to be, in
general, more pro-prosecutorial, are less aware of and would
give less consideration to the presumption of innocence, and are
more likely to believe police officer's testimony. 2 4 My first
question is, do you think that presents a problem, because you
now have a different kind of a jury that is going to make the
guilt determination in a capital case? Secondly, statistics have
also shown, in New York especially, that if you look at those
who are anti-death penalty, and therefore cannot sit as jurors in a
11 Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y. 2d 309, 314, 229 N.E.2d 426, 429, 282 N.Y.S
2d 739, 743(1967).
124 See Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 Stan.
L. Rev. 1245, 1258-62 (1974); Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and
Representatives of Death-Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado
Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 1 (1970).
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capital case; more blacks, more Hispanics and more women are
anti-death penalty, so you are going to end up with jurors on the
guilt phase of the trial who are not going to be as representative
of the community as jurors who sit in other cases." Can you
just respond?
Mr. Quinn:
The first point you are talking about jurors that are anti-death
penalty, also excluded, and most articles forget to mention the
fact that those people that would seek the death penalty in every
situation must be excluded as well. By so limiting, you are
limiting the pool, but is that pool large enough so that a
defendant can get an unprejudiced jury? I believe it is. Are there
particular people who will be excluded from the panel? Yes,
there will. The scheme that is set up has been found to meet
constitutional muster by the Supreme Court." 6 And it is also set
up specifically to protect the defendant in terms of - we talk
about the mitigation at that point in time when mitigation should
be proven. It is the defendant who has the ability then to bring
forth evidence to show reasons why leniency should be shown
toward him.
ProfessorKlein:
I was not worrying about what happens after that jury
determines the defendant is guilty. I was asking about the group
125People

v. Hale, 173 Misc. 2d 140, 162, 661 N.Y.S.2d 457, 485 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1997). Interestingly however, "since the new death penalty
statute was passed ... whites have committed only 18% of death eligible
murders, yet 60% of all defendants against whom a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty has been filed are white." Id. at 160, 661 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
11 See generally Lockhart v. McRee, 476 U.S. 162, 167 (1986), Wainwright
v.Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 421 (1985), Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980).
"[Tihe proper constitutional standard is simply whether a prospective juror's
views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'" Id. (citations
omitted).
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of people who are going to be making the determination whether
the defendant is guilty or innocent of the crime to start with.
Mr. Quinn:
The first point, obviously, must be the assistance of counsel
who conducts his or her voir dire. They, obviously, have to
make the determination based upon what questions are asked.
The statutory scheme in New York requires that each juror be
individually voir dired so that questions can be asked and
answered in a much more private setting. Jurors may be much
more willing to answer those questions in that setting than they
would be willing to answer in front of a panel of twelve or more.
It, obviously, presents an issue, but the Supreme Court has
upheld it.
ProfessorKlein:
Judge Hancock, perhaps if I could ask you a question that I
think many people have wondered about, and it is a rare
opportunity to have someone who has actually sat as a judge on
the Court of Appeals here with us. To what extent do you think
politics might play a role in the Court of Appeals' ultimate
determination of the constitutionality of the statute? I mean, we
know that they have been subjected to criticism. We know that
judges across the state, and even across the country have been
recently subjected to a lot of criticism by politicians. 27 Do you
think in any way the political ramifications of the decision by the
Court of Appeals finding the statute unconstitutional might
somehow lead them to not take that step?

'27 See generally Bettijane Levine, More Judges Feeling The Heat Of
Criticism, Times Union, Apr. 10, 1997, at 3; Jonathan Lippman, Preserving
JudicialIndependence, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 27, 1997, at 1.
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Judge Hancock:
No, I do not think so. Having been a judge for twenty-three
years, having been criticized, as any judge is, by people who
disagree with your decisions, I know that it would not affect me.
A judge has a sworn duty to make the decision as he or she sees
fit. I have every confidence that the people who are now on the
Court of Appeals, in the Appellate Divisions and in the state
judiciary generally will carry that out. Now, you ask about the
possibility of politics entering in. The only way that politics
could conceivably enter in would be in the selection of future
appointees to the Court. That is a possibility. Again, it is not
political in the true sense of the word, but there could be some
sort of an indication on the part of a future appointee as to how
that appointee views the death penalty, as such; and so it is
conceivable that it could enter into it in the years ahead, but I
would not like to think that would not be so. But as to the
present court and the judges that are now in office, I say
absolutely not. Political ramifications would not affect them at
all.
ProfessorKlein
Mr. Quinn, I think those of us who have been concerned about
the death penalty in this country for a long time took some solace
in what has happened in New York with the creation of the
Capital Defenders Office. I am sure you know, especially
throughout the South, when you look at the quality of the
effectiveness of counsel for people in death penalty cases it is
been absolutely abhorrent. There have been lawyers who have
been paid very, very low fees in a capital case and they have
spent very little time preparing the case or actually bringing the
case to trial. In New York we have had the Court of Appeals
approve monies being given to assist counsel in a capital case for
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paralegal work, as well as for lower-level law associates.' 28 But
the Pataki administration has taken the position of refusing to
allocate funds; forty dollars an hour, I think it was, for low-level
law associates and twenty-five dollars an hour for paralegals.' 29
This week that issue has been litigated in Geneseo County.' 3" I
just wonder if you can explain why exactly the administration is
opposing the allocation of funds, and is not going along with the
Court of Appeals in approving of funds for paralegals, for
lawyers, and for assistance in a capital prosecution.
Mr. Quinn:

Not being involved with the case and not being part of the
administration, it would be inappropriate for me to take a position
with respect as to why the governor has made that decision, as
well as the Attorney General's Office who would be defending
the decision. I cannot speak for the reasoning why. If I were to
speculate, I would speculate that the governor has made the
decision that the increased fees, the money allocated for the
capital defender, as well as the increased fees for capital cases is
sufficient to protect the defendants. It would provide sufficient
monetary means for counsel to represent the defendants.
ProfessorKlein:

Judge Hancock, Mr. Quinn did refer to the fact that there were
one hundred and twenty-two murder prosecutions in the firstdegree, and I think that there are only thirteen cases in which the
death penalty is actually being sought. Why do you think that
number is so few?

" See Daniel Wise, Capital Cases: Preparingfor the Unbelievable, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 14, 1997, at 1.
129 Id.
130 Mahony v. Pataki, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 1997, at 27 (Sup. Ct. Genessee
County 1997).
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Judge Hancock:
Well, of course, it depends upon the mix of the cases. A
typical case, which the prosecutor might choose not to prosecute
as a death case, would be a felony murder case,' which could
conceivably be murder one, where you could seek the death
penalty. But there are so many felony murders, particularly in
drug-related cases, things of that kind, where, I hate to use this
terminology, but I will, there is the typical drug, robbery, felony
murder. Those usually are not cases where the District Attorney
seeks the death penalty. There are many, many of those cases in
New York City in the metropolitan area. There is one startling
contrast. There is a felony murder robbery case in Albany; a
defendant held up and killed a taxi driver. It is a murder one,
and the death penalty is being sought in Albany. There is the
identical case, either in Manhattan or in the Bronx, where the
death penalty is not sought. I hate to use the term a "run of the
mill felony murder," but that is the way such murders are often
treated.
The Audience:
If I could interject, and I will only take a second. One of the
reasons that this happens is because one of the functions of the
capital defenders is to submit mitigation evidence to the District
Attorney in capital eligible cases before he charges. So in many
cases, the District Attorney looks at the mitigation evidence that it
is going to be presented and says, I cannot get a conviction for
that. That is essentially what the capital defenders have been
131

N.Y. PENAL LAw 125.25(3) (1995).

This statute provides in pertinent

part:
Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or
attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the
first degree, sodomy in the first degree, or escape in the second
degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of
immediate flight therefrom, he, another participant, if there be any,
causes the death of a person other than one of the participants....
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doing in many of the cases today. It results in the consequence
you are talking about where officially two cases look the same,
but the mitigation evidence looks very different.
Mr. Quinn:

There are two reasons for that situation. In Albany County
there has been an increased influx of drugs by mass
transportation, specifically buses. The District Attorney has
taken the view that this would be a factor in his determination in
deciding to seek the death penalty, because the influx comes from
outside Albany County. The Judge spoke about the capital
defender providing mitigation. The capital defender does do so
in certain instances; however, in the most celebrated case that is
in the Court of Appeals now with respect to the murder of Kevin
Gillespie, the police officer, they chose not to.132 They made a
conscious decision that they would not show us anything.
Whereas, in a case in Oswego County where an eighteen-year old
white man shot his mother and father in the head, they chose to
do so, and in so doing, the Attorney General made a decision that
he would offer a life without parole.'33 The decision that they
make will have an ultimate impact on what is actually offered or
whether the prosecutor seeks the death penalty in this situation.
There is one other point that is just an anecdote. We talk about
deterrence and people cannot prove deterrence. I can just let you
know Judge Brennan has spoken about Colin Ferguson. At Colin
Ferguson's first court appearance after the election in November,
1994. His first question to the judge was now that Governor
Pataki has been elected, do I face the death penalty? He was a
scared individual. I think some correction officers stirred up part
of it and they may have played some cruel jokes on him, but it
certainly entered into his mind after the fact. I do not know

"' In re Johnson v. Pataki, 229 A.D.2d 242, 642 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1st Dep't),
leave to appeal denied, 90 N.Y.2d 900, 685 N.E.2d 211, 662 N.Y.S.2d 430

(1997).
"' People v. Gordon Mower, Oswego County, Indictment #96-15.
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whether he would have been in the situation had the death penalty
been in place in 1993.
ProfessorKlein:
We have time for a few questions.
The Audience:
Thank you. This is directed to the Judge regarding the
Jackson13 ' argument. As I am sure you are aware, in North
Carolina v. Alford,135 the Supreme Court permitted a plea of
guilty in the capital case where the defendant said the only reason
he was going to plead guilty was because he did not want to die
in the gas chamber. So they permitted a plea to a non-capital
murder offense. I have a second question, but I would like to
hear, if I could, how you would reconcile the Alford case with
Jackson. Don't you think Alford undermines your Jackson

argument?
Judge Hancock:

I will be happy to comment on that. You are familiar with
Brady,1 36 and Alford.1 37 All of those cases do not involve facial
134

390 U.S. 570 (1968).

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). Defendant was indicted
for first-degree murder, a capital offense in North Carolina. Id. at 26. Even
though defendant claimed to be innocent he accepted a reduced charge of
second-degree murder and pled guilty. Id. at 27. Defendant then sought post
conviction relief claiming that his guilty plea was the result of fear and
coercion. Id. at 29. The Supreme Court held that the guilty plea, which
represented a voluntary and intelligent choice among alternatives available to
defendant, especially where he was represented by competent counsel, was not
compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment merely because the plea
was entered to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. Id. at 37.
136 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Brady was charged with
kidnapping and entered a plea of guilty upon learning that his co-defendant
would enter a plea of guilty and would also testify against him. Id. at 743-44.
Brady was subsequently convicted and then sought relief claiming his plea was
135
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attacks on the statute. These are cases where the sole question
had to do with whether or not the particular plea given in the case
was voluntary. These pleas were entered after the Jackson
decision came down. So the courts have adopted the rule, and it
alluded to in People v. Michael A. C., 138 which I just read, that
Jackson does not hold that the Federal Kidnapping Law"' is
inherently coercive. It does not say that. It says that the Federal
Kidnapping Law imposes an unconstitutional inducement, which
violates the defendant's rights. Had the holding been that it was
inherently coercive, then every plea would be knocked out. So

that is the distinction. It is not inherently coercive. These cases
that you have alluded to are fact specific cases having to do with

particular pleas in specific cases.
The Audience:
This is to Mr. Quinn. It is been long recognized that juries
have the right of nullification, not merely because they believe
that the law applied to the facts of this case would be unjust, but
also because they might feel the law itself is unjust in the case of
not voluntary. Id. He alleged that his counsel exerted pressure on him and
that his plea was induced by representations with respect to reduction and
clemency. Id. The Supreme Court held that nothing in the record impeached
Brady's plea or suggested that his admissions in open court were anything but
the truth. Id. at 758.
The Court was also convinced that his plea was
voluntary and intelligently made. Id.
137 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
138 27 N.Y.2d 79, 261 N.E.2d 620, 313 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1970). The court
found that:
[A]lthough any defendant, including a youthful offender, is
free to consent to a trial without a jury if, in fact and reality,
he prefers to be so tried - and knowingly waives his
constitutional right - this does not mean that a State may
demand that such a consent be given as an absolute
precondition to affording him the benefits of youthful
offender treatment.
Id. at 85, 261 N.E.2d at 624, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
139 18 U.S.C. 1201(a) (1997). This statute imposes the penalty of death, or
of any prison term, for transporting a kidnap victim through interstate
commerce. Id.
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a death sentence that perhaps the penalty itself might be unjust,
by loading the jury, by creating a death qualified jury, are you
not, in essence, revoking part of jury nullification?
Mr. Quinn:
There has been a lot written about jury nullification. I do not
know that it is a particular right, it is just a function of the jury
system. You keep talking about death qualified. I think that you
have two adversaries, one at each table. Their job is to seek that
person who is, I assume, most favorable to their client or their
purpose as well. So you have the competing interest in the
courtroom every day. I do not know that by knocking out those
people that would never impose a death penalty you create a
situation where a case would never be nullified. The penalty
phase is at a point in time where people have the opportunity to
learn much more about the defendant. Obviously, the defendant
can sit throughout the trial and not say anything or not do
anything. But at the time of the penalty phase, it is his obligation
and wanton wish to put forth as much evidence as possible to
show him to be, for lack of a better words right now, a caring
individual, decent human being, and give reasons to mitigate why
he should be put to death. The defendant has that opportunity.
By suggesting that, I do not think we can take away from the jury
and say that jurors are not going to be human beings when they
are sitting on there. Just because they agree that they can at some
point in time impose the death penalty does not mean that they do
not have a heart, and to see whom the person is and not vote to
impose death.
Judge Brennan:
I am going to thank Professor Schwartz and Dean Glickstein
for allowing us to put this program together. I think it has been a
great day. There have been an awful lot of challenging and
thought-provoking remarks. Thank you very, very much.
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